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Projections of global food supply and demand to the year 2020 indicate that food
production in the aggregate is likely to keep pace with growing populations and
incomes, and that real food prices will be stable or slowly declining. This article
examines the possible environmental and resource constraints to long-term food
production growth and explores the implications of these possible constraints for
food and resource policies. The article reviews and synthesises the evidence on
biophysical limits to crop productivity; plant genetic resources and biotechnology;
the availability of plant nutrients; soil and land degradation; the increasing scarcity
and declining quality of water; and the impact of global climate change on
agriculture.
1. Introduction
Global food policy has been driven by the need to feed an increasing
population, and to support diversi¢ed consumption patterns as incomes rise.
Agricultural production growth has been able to meet these goals: in the past
three decades e¡ective demand has been met while real food prices have
declined dramatically. Projections from global food supply and demand
models developed at the International Food Policy Research Institute
(IFPRI) (Rosegrant et al. 1995), the Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) (Alexandratos 1995), and the World Bank (Mitchell and Ingco 1993)
indicate that food production is likely to keep pace with growing populations
and incomes, and real food prices will be stable or slowly declining over the
next twenty years. However, spurred by the increasing policy priority for
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been raised that the long-term growth rates in agricultural production
projected in these global models are unsustainable (Brown 1995; Kendall
and Pimentel 1994). In this article, we assess whether environmental and
resource limitations are likely to threaten future global food supplies.
We ¢rst brie£y summarise recent trends in crop area, yield and
production, describe IFPRI's global food projections model, present an
overview of food supply and demand projections using this model, and
compare these projections with historical trends. The article focuses on
cereals, which are the key staple crops for most of the world. We then
examine possible environmental and resource constraints to long-term
agricultural growth. Di¡erent sections assess the potential for expansion of
cropland area and land losses due to urbanisation; biophysical limits to crop
productivity; plant genetic resources and biotechnology; the future role of
chemical fertiliser in agricultural growth; the economics of energy for
agriculture; the impact of land degradation on crop productivity; the e¡ect
of increasing scarcity and declining quality of water; and the impact of global
warming.
2. Trends in global food production
Trends in area, production and yield for cereals are summarised in table 1,
for the periods 1967^82, and 1982^94. The two sub-periods roughly divide
the table into a peak-Green Revolution period and a post-Green Revolution
period. The pattern of growth of cereal yields shows a signi¢cant slowdown
after 1982, but hardly the stagnation in yields claimed by some observers
(Brown and Kane 1994; Plucknett 1995). In the developed world, the
slowdown in crop area, yield and production growth was primarily policy-
induced, as North American and European governments drew down cereal
stocks and scaled back farm-price support programs in favour of direct
payments to farmers. The economic collapse and subsequent economic
reforms in the former centrally planned economies in Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union further depressed crop production for developed
countries as a whole.
The slowdown in cereal productivity growth in developing countries, and
particularly in Asia, since the early 1980s, has been caused by declining
world cereal prices and by factors related to the increasing intensi¢cation of
cereal production. Increased intensity of land use has led to increasing input
requirements in order to sustain yield gains (Rosegrant and Pingali 1994;
Byerlee 1994; Morris and Byerlee 1996). Between 1982 and 1995, real world
wheat prices declined by 28 per cent, rice prices by 42 per cent, and corn
prices by 43 per cent (computed from World Bank 1996a). The declining
402 M.W. Rosegrant and C. Ringler
# Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1997price of cereals has caused a direct shift of land out of cereals and into more
pro¢table cropping alternatives and has slowed the growth in input use and
investment in crop research and irrigation infrastructure, with consequent
e¡ects on yield growth (Rosegrant and Pingali 1994; Rosegrant and
Svendsen 1993). Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of cereal yield growth
in the developing world since 1982 is not that growth was slower than in the
previous period, but that growth has been as high as it was in the face of
steeply declining real prices.
3. Projections of global food supply and demand
Global food projections have been made using IFPRI's global food model,
the International Model for Policy Analysis of Commodities and Trade
(IMPACT). IMPACT covers 37 countries and regions (which account for
virtually all of the world's food production and consumption), and 17 com-
modities, including all cereals, roots and tubers, soybean, and meats. The
model is speci¢ed as a set of country-level supply and demand equations.
Each country model is linked to the rest of the world through trade. Demand
Table 1 Crop area, production and yield growth rates, 1967^1994.
a
1967^94 1967^82 1982^94
Area Prod. Yield Area Prod. Yield Area Prod. Yield
(per cent per year)
Wheat
Developed ÿ0.68 0.94 1.64 ÿ0.12 1.73 1.87 ÿ1.38 ÿ0.03 1.35
Developing 0.99 4.29 3.27 1.45 5.39 3.88 0.42 2.94 2.52
World 0.00 2.13 2.13 0.48 2.88 2.40 ÿ0.59 1.20 1.80
Maize
Developed 0.24 1.99 1.74 0.64 3.05 2.33 ÿ0.26 0.69 1.01
Developing 0.96 3.55 2.56 0.65 3.46 2.80 1.36 3.66 2.27
World 0.70 2.63 1.91 0.64 3.20 2.52 0.77 1.93 1.16
Paddy rice
Developed ÿ0.25 0.07 0.32 ÿ0.23 ÿ0.14 0.09 ÿ0.28 0.34 0.61
Developing 0.55 2.68 2.13 0.81 3.21 2.38 0.21 2.03 1.81
World 0.52 2.51 1.98 0.78 2.96 2.17 0.20 1.94 1.74
Other grains
Developed ÿ0.44 0.38 0.82 0.52 1.32 0.79 ÿ1.63 ÿ0.78 0.85
Developing ÿ0.43 0.68 1.11 ÿ0.87 1.20 2.08 0.12 0.03 ÿ0.09
World ÿ0.43 0.48 0.91 ÿ0.15 1.28 1.43 ÿ0.79 ÿ0.52 0.26
Note:
a Based on three-year moving averages.
Source of basic data: FAO 1997.
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production in each country is determined by crop prices and the rate of
productivity growth. Future productivity growth is estimated by its com-
ponent sources, including management research, conventional plant
breeding, wide-crossing and hybridisation breeding, and biotechnology and
transgenic breeding. Other sources of growth considered include private
sector agricultural research and development, agricultural extension and
education, markets, infrastructure and irrigation. IMPACT is described in
detail in Rosegrant et al. (1995). Results presented here are from a new
version of IMPACT, with the base year updated from 1990 to 1993.
3.1 World food prices
The baseline projections results of the IMPACT model indicate that cereal
production in the world will grow fast enough for world prices of cereals to
be falling, but at a slower rate than in recent years. Cereal prices on average
are projected to drop by 11 per cent by 2020. The decline in prices is
accompanied by increasing world trade in food, with the developing world as
a group increasing its food imports from the developed world. Net cereal
imports of developing countries will more than double by 2020, reaching 228
million metric tons. In the next section, we address the underlying trends in
food demand and production that produce these projections of a continued
(but much slower) decline in food prices.
3.2 Food and feed demand
The most important underlying trends on the demand side are rapidly
increasing urbanisation, changing tastes and preferences, and rising incomes,
which are causing a shift to more diversi¢ed diets with higher per person
consumption of meat, milk and milk products, fruits and vegetables, and
lower per person consumption of cereals. In China and much of Southeast
Asia, per person consumption of rice is already falling; and rates of growth
in per person cereal consumption are declining even in South Asia. This
dietary transition reduces demand pressure on basic food staples. At the
same time, these trends will increase the demand for maize and coarse grains
for animal feeds.
Growth rates in total food and feed demand will decline, due to both
changes in the diet structure and a continued gradual slowdown in
population growth. Table 2 shows the projected increase in total cereal
demand between 1993 and 2020. Total cereal demand will increase by about
718 million metric tons during this period, from 1.8 billion metric tons in
1993 to 2.5 billion metric tons in 2020. More than 80 per cent of this increase
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e¡ects are higher than in the developed economies. The almost 20 per cent
share of the developed countries will be mainly in maize, and to a lesser
degree in wheat and other coarse grains. China and India will jointly account
for more than 30 per cent of the total cereal demand increases. The rest of
Asia will account for another 16 per cent. Sub-Saharan Africa and West Asia
and North Africa will each account for about 12 per cent, and Latin America
for 10 per cent.
3.3 Area and yield growth
As shown in table 3, area expansion will almost cease to contribute to future
production growth, with a total addition to area in cereals and roots and
tubers by 2020 of only 47 million ha, from a total of 749 million ha in 1993.
In Asia, crop area will increase by less than 2 per cent by 2020. Only in
Sub-Saharan Africa will area expansion still be substantial; much of this
increase will be in subsistence farming of roots and tubers (table 3). The
projected slow growth in expansion of crop area places the burden to meet
future cereal demand on crop yield growth.
Although yield growth will vary considerably by commodity and country,
in general we project a decline in the rates of growth in crop yields compared
to the already reduced rates of the 1982^94 period (table 4). For developing
countries as a group, wheat yields are projected to grow at 1.3 per cent per
year (compared to 2.5 per cent since 1982); rice yields at 1.1 per cent
(compared to 1.8 per cent); and maize yields at 1.4 per cent (compared to 2.3
Table 2 Increase in total demand for cereals, by region, 1993^2020
Rice Wheat Maize Other grains
(million metric tons)
China 21.0 40.3 79.3 5.1
India 35.4 39.2 3.2 6.8
Other South Asia 15.8 27.4 2.1 0.8
Other East Asia 1.2 3.4 11.0 0.7
Southeast Asia 28.2 7.5 18.0 0.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 11.9 10.3 28.1 34.2
Latin America 7.8 12.8 40.5 9.4
West Asia and North Africa 6.5 51.2 9.9 20.9
Developed 1.5 30.5 56.1 38.6
Developing 128.0 192.4 192.3 78.3
World, total 129.5 229.9 248.4 116.9
% increase from
1993, World
36.1 40.3 47.2 34.8
Source: IMPACT simulations.
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are expected to grow at 1.2 per cent per year (compared to ÿ0:1 per cent
since 1982). Rice yields in China are projected to grow at 0.7 per cent per
year between 1993 and 2020, compared to the 1.8 per cent annual growth
rate since 1982. For wheat, the annual yield growth rate will be 0.9 per cent,
compared to the 3.0 per cent growth rate since 1982. Yield growth for rice
and wheat will also slow down in India and elsewhere in South Asia relative
to recent trends ^ but for these countries, where Green Revolution
technology was exploited later, yield growth rates will remain above those in
China and Southeast Asia. Some recovery is projected for cereal yield growth
rates in Sub-Saharan Africa with improved political stability, increased use
of inputs, and policy reform.
Table 3 Crop area harvested, cereal and root crops, by region, 1993^2020
1993 2020 Increase,
(million hectares) 1993^2020
China 98.2 99.0 0.9
India 100.8 102.8 2.0
Other South Asia 27.1 28.0 0.9
Other East Asia 4.0 3.6 ÿ0.4
Southeast Asia 51.5 52.7 1.2
Sub-Saharan Africa 78.4 107.6 29.2
Latin America 51.9 58.4 6.5
West Asia and North Africa 56.4 58.3 1.9
Developed 280.1 284.7 4.6
Developing 468.6 510.8 42.2
World, total 748.6 795.5 46.8
Source: IMPACT simulations.
Table 4 Yield growth rates for various crops, by region, 1993^2020
Rice Wheat Maize Other grains
China 0.69 0.88 1.40 0.39
India 1.43 1.53 1.75 0.80
Other South Asia 1.50 1.45 1.84 0.62
Other East Asia 0.47 1.38 1.88 0.51
Southeast Asia 1.19 0.29 1.79 0.50
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.88 1.29 1.80 1.52
Latin America 1.94 1.64 1.25 0.98
West Asia and North Africa 1.81 1.70 1.39 2.20
Developed 0.53 1.06 0.84 0.78
Developing 1.08 1.30 1.36 1.24
World, total 1.05 1.17 1.03 0.85
Source: IMPACT simulations.
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attained? What are the possible environmental and resource base constraints
to attaining the necessary production to meet rising populations and
incomes? In the remaining sections, we examine these issues and discuss their
implications for environmental and resource policy.
4. Cropland potential and land loss to urbanisation
In 1993, crop area harvested for cereal and root crops was 749 million ha
(280 million ha in the developed world, and 469 million ha in the developing
world); and, according to the IMPACT simulations, this area will increase
to 796 million ha by 2020. There will be virtually no increase in crop area in
developed countries, while in developing countries the area will increase to
511 million ha (table 3). Cereal and root crop area represented just over 70
per cent of total crop area in 1993.
4.1 Cropland potential
In order to obtain an estimate of the cropland potential, the entire land area
which could be possibly converted to agricultural uses has to be taken into
account. According to Buringh and Dudal (1987), out of 12400 million ha of
land resources, consisting of arable land, permanent pasture, forest and
woodland and other land, 10100 million ha have zero potential for growing
crops, 2600 million ha have a low or medium capability for crop production,
and 700 million ha have a high potential. Thus, the theoretical maximum
potential suitable for crop production would be at least 3300 million ha.
However, most of the currently cultivated land constitutes relatively good
agricultural land, and the productivity of other land forms converted into
cropland is expected to be lower than the existing land stock. Conversion
also eliminates forest and rangelands, which ful¢l essential functions in their
present uses. Thus, according to Kendall and Pimentel (1994), the world's
arable land might be expanded at most by 500 million ha, at a productivity
below present levels. The majority of potential cropland, about 87 per cent,
is located in developing countries, mainly in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin
America. In Asia, on the other hand, nearly 80 per cent of the potentially
arable land is already under cultivation (Plucknett 1995).
Both the theoretical maximum potential crop area and the more realistic
lower potential for conversion of land resources to agricultural production
are far higher than the actual IMPACT projections of increases in cropland
through the year 2020. Therefore, the lack of cropland per se cannot be
considered a major constraint to future agricultural production growth.
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It has been suggested that current, unprecedented increases in urban
population may constitute a potential threat to agricultural production
through the loss of agricultural prime land (Brown and Kane 1994). The
urban population in the world is expected to increase to over 5 billion by
2025, from 1.5 billion in 1975, and 2.6 billion in 1995. This implies an overall
urban growth rate of 2.3 per cent between 1995 and 2025. The majority of
the population is projected to live in urban areas by 2025 (61 per cent), up
from 38 per cent in 1975 and 45 per cent in 1995. Whereas more than 70 per
cent of the population in both North America and Europe was living in
urban areas by 1995, urbanisation accounted only for 34 and 35 per cent in
Africa and Asia, respectively. Almost all urban population growth, about 90
per cent, will therefore occur in developing countries, where roughly
150000 people are added to the urban population every day (WRI 1996).
This expansion of the urban population has been estimated to result in
476000 ha of arable land being transformed annually to urban uses in
developing countries (USAID 1988). This would be equivalent to a loss of
14.2 million ha of land to urban uses between 1990 and 2020.
However, there is very little data on urban absorption of land previously
under cultivation. The actual cropland loss would have to be determined
considering the type of land converted into urban uses, as well as the ¢nal
urban per person land area. Historically, more potential cropland has been
converted to agricultural activities and grazing than urbanisation has taken
away. Even assuming that the 14 million ha of land converted to urban uses
came completely from crop area, this would represent a loss of only 2.6 per
cent of projected cereal and root crop area in 2020. Given that 42 million ha
of additional cropland could be brought under cultivation by 2010 through
increases in cropping intensity on existing cropland (Alexandratos 1995), and
that 500 million ha of potential cropland is available for conversion, the loss
of land to urbanisation will not be a serious threat to the projected growth
in crop area.
5. Physical limits to crop productivity
Global food production can increase through expansion of cropping area
and increases in cropping intensity (see above), or through increases in
agricultural productivity. Although there is ample margin to expand
agricultural area, overall crop area, as shown in the IMPACT simulations, is
expected to grow only slowly due mainly to projected declining world food
prices. Thus, increases in agricultural productivity will have to bear the brunt
of achieving the necessary production rates to meet global food demand.
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high-yielding varieties of wheat and rice, the development and application of
chemical fertilisers and other agricultural chemicals, accompanied by
investments in institutional infrastructure and irrigation, substantially
increased agricultural output in the 1960s and up to the 1980s; recently,
however, it has been suggested that rice and wheat yields have reached a
yield plateau, and from Asia it has been reported that some areas experience
production pressures under increasing intensi¢cation and might face
declining factor productivity (Plucknett 1995; Brown and Kane 1994).
Facing all these challenges, will agricultural productivity as the main
engine of agricultural production growth be able to keep up with global food
needs, or are the biophysical yield limits already within reach? Are the
projected yield growth rates up to 2020 achievable? The earth's biophysical
limit of food production is reached when all land suitable for agriculture is
cropped and irrigated, and the potential yield on each ¢eld is attained and
the remaining suitable grazing land is grazed. There is a speci¢c upper limit
to crop yield on any given piece of land, which is determined by soil type,
climate, crop properties, and available irrigation water; it is reached when
the farmer selects the optimal combination of crop species and management
practices (Penning de Vries et al. 1995).
Maximum theoretical yields are calculated for speci¢c crops as the highest
limit of biological potential for a given location on the basis of
photosynthetic potential, land quality, length of the growing season, and
water availability. Maximum theoretical yields in grain equivalents (with rice
in milled form) were calculated by Linneman et al. in 1979. Biophysical
limits vary from one region to another due to di¡erent underlying conditions
in the agricultural sectors. Whereas South America has a huge potential for
increasing agricultural production, with an estimated maximum production
of 18 tons per ha per year, the limits are lower for Africa (14 tons per ha),
Asia (13 tons per ha), North and Central America (11 tons per ha), and
Europe and Australia (10 tons per ha). These numbers indicate a wide
margin between actual yields (between 0.7 and 3.8 tons per ha per season, on
average, in 1990^92) and theoretical maximum yields. Projected yields in
2020 are all well below the maximum theoretical yields. Thus, despite the
slowdown in yield growth over the past ¢fteen years, overall yield trends by
country and region indicate ample room for yield improvement in most crops
and regions (Plucknett 1995). Existing wide disparities in yields among
countries in the same region and between continents also give rise to the
expectation that considerable improvements in agricultural productivity
could be achieved.
However, in order to maintain yield growth and to further increase the
yield potential, agricultural research at several levels will be essential:
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research to maximise yields through improved and extended resistance to
biotic and abiotic plant stresses; research towards closing the yield gaps
between farm yields and practical farm and research station yields, and
strategic research towards raising the yield ceilings (Plucknett 1995).
6. Plant genetic resources
Can the plant genetic base sustain further growth in food crop yields and
thus hold the promise given by physical limits to crop productivity? Genetic
resources can be conserved ex situ (not in the original or natural environ-
ment), or in situ (where naturally recurring). Ex situ strategies preserve plant
seeds and propagating parts in gene banks, preventing the loss of species
and subspecies. In situ conservation allows observation of the evolution of
species as they interact with pests and pathogens (Smale and McBride
1996).
In situ conservation of genetic resources may be an important complement
to ex situ conservation because it allows adaptive and evolutionary processes
to continue, and may provide as yet unknown genetic characteristics for
future breeding (Wright 1996; Smale and McBride 1996). However, for the
foreseeable future, crop yield increases will rely on germplasm drawn from
breeding lines stored ex situ (Wright 1996; Evenson and Gollin 1994). Global
ex situ storage of germplasm is substantial for the major food crops.
Approximately 75 to 90 per cent of the estimated genetic variation in the
major crops and about 50 per cent for minor crops is found in gene banks
(Wilkes 1992). Concerns, however, have been expressed about the
availability of information on sources, propagation techniques, basic
characteristics, and the quality of some of the germplasm held in gene banks
(McNeely et al. 1990). Nevertheless, if funding is sustained for proper
documentation, evaluation and maintenance of the existing system of
germplasm banks, the availability of germplasm appears su¤cient to sustain
future breeding e¡orts to support the crop yield growth rates projected
above.
6.1 Crop genetic diversity
Although the available germplasm is characterised by wide genetic variation,
the number of varieties actually tapped and utilised to develop new varieties
is relatively small at any given point in time. This practice has led to the
criticism that the development of modern rice and wheat varieties has
narrowed the genetic base in farmers' ¢elds, thereby increasing the threat of
disastrous yield declines if, for example, genetic resistance to an insect or
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understanding of genetic diversity in terms of spatial or cross-sectional
diversity. Moreover, for wheat, even spatial diversity (measured as the
concentration of leading varieties in farmers' ¢elds at a given point in time),
is increasing over time, and is greater now than in the early twentieth century
(Smale 1996; Smale and McBride 1996). For rice, spatial diversity may have
narrowed following the introduction of modern varieties in the 1960s.
However, spatial diversity is only one measure of genetic diversity, and other
important measures have improved over time for rice (and wheat): temporal
diversity (average age and rate of replacement of cultivars); polygenic
diversity (the pyramiding of multiple genes for resistance to provide longer-
lasting protection for pathogens); and pedigree complexity (the number of
landraces, pureline selections, and mutants that are ancestors of a released
variety) (Evenson and Gollin 1994; Smale 1996). Genetic diversity is multi-
dimensional, di¤cult and expensive to measure, and extraordinarily com-
plex. Nevertheless, trends in genetic diversity of cereal crops are mainly
positive, with diversity generated primarily as a byproduct to breeding for
yield and quality improvement.
7. Biotechnology
The key to tapping the potential represented by the available genetic
resources (and to increasing genetic diversity) will increasingly be the
application of biotechnology in tandem with conventional plant breeding.
Biotechnology for agriculture includes (a) agricultural microbiology; (b) cell
and tissue culture for rapid propagation of plant species and facilitation of
wide crosses between di¡erent species; (c) new diagnostics methods using
monoclonal antibodies or nucleic acid probes to identify diseases and viruses;
(d) genetic mapping techniques for faster identi¢cation of useful genetic
material to make conventional plant breeding more e¤cient; and (e) genetic
engineering to incorporate `alien' or novel genes into plant species (Persley
1994; Leisinger 1995). Unlike conventional breeding, genetic engineering can
create `transgenic' crops, that include genetic material that would otherwise
never or only in extremely rare cases belong to a certain species (de Kathen
1996).
The bene¢ts of biotechnology include the introduction of higher plant
resistance to pests and diseases; the development of tolerance to adverse
weather conditions; the improvement in nutritional value of some foods; and
ultimately the increase in the genetic yield potential of plants. The main
successes of biotechnology thus far have been in improved pest and disease
resistance, increasing yields through reduction in yield losses and extension
of potential areas for production of high-yielding crops, rather than direct
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plants in developing countries identi¢ed 159 releases, nearly one-half of
which conveyed herbicide resistance, one-third provided insect resistance,
and the remainder virus resistance, product quality and other improvements
(de Kathen 1996).
The International Agricultural Research Centers (IARCs), after a
relatively slow start, have been increasing their research in crop-related
modern biotechnology; and over the 1985^95 period, about US $260 million
have been provided for international agricultural biotechnology programs,
including US $206 million for 25 international agricultural research
programs and about US $7 million for four international biotechnology
networks (Cohen 1994). Biotechnology research is currently dominated by
the private sector in developed countries: it is estimated that some US
$900 million was spent on agricultural biotechnology research and
development in 1985, of which US $800 million was spent in developed
countries and US $550 million by the private sector (Livernash 1996).
The small share of developing countries in biotechnology research is partly
due to time-lags caused by the development of a complex and expensive
technology that originated in the developed world. But it is also a function of
what appears to have been a conscious decision on the part of developing
country research centres and the IARCs to `go slow' on biotechnology,
because of the perception (a) that biotechnology research had not yet
reached the state of `tool development' where large expenditures would be
justi¢ed; (b) that biotechnology research in the modern era of intellectual
property rights is inherently a private sector activity; and (c) that the support
system for the IARCs and National Agricultural Research Institutes (NARs)
is oriented towards the development of technology, not upstream science
(Evenson and Rosegrant 1993). Although all three justi¢cations have some
validity, it will be crucial to increase biotechnology research aimed at the
situations prevalent in developing countries, in order to give these countries
access to the next-generation yield potentials; as compared to most current
agricultural biotechnology research undertaken in developed countries,
which is aimed at plants suitable for temperate climates (Livernash 1996).
Fortunately, new institutional arrangements between developed and
developing countries have been put in place recently, and some developing
countries, like China or India, have increased their annual budgets for their
research institutes. The IARCs could play an essential role in developing
local biotechnology capacity, sharing information across countries, and
collaborating with private-sector partners (Livernash 1996). This process
would be greatly facilitated by the removal of unnecessary barriers to the
free movement of plant materials, clari¢cation of biosafety regulations, and
provision of improved property rights protection for new products
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centres continue to grow, biotechnology will provide a signi¢cant boost to
crop production in the next century.
8. Fertiliser
Can continued expansion of fertiliser use support the projected gains in crop
yields without damaging the environment? Global fertiliser use (in nutrient
terms) increased from 27 million tons in 1960 to 146 million tons in 1989 and
decreased thereafter to 121 million tons in 1994. This drop in global fertiliser
use is primarily the result of steep declines in fertiliser application in the
reforming economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Bumb
and Baanante 1996). The developing countries' share of global fertiliser use
increased to 58 per cent in 1995, compared to 10 per cent in 1960 and 31 per
cent in 1980 (Bumb and Baanante 1996).
With long-term high growth rates in fertiliser use and declining growth
rates in yield, fertiliser levels in relatively favourable areas of Asia are now
quite high, and increasing amounts of fertiliser are being used to maintain
current yield levels. In parts of Asia, including West Java in Indonesia, the
Indian Punjab, and parts of China, fertilisers are being used at or above
economically optimum levels at border prices. In East Asia, average fertiliser
use is nearly 220 kilograms per hectare. In much of this region, further
increases in fertiliser application will be small, but there is considerable room
for improvement in fertiliser use e¤ciency, nutrient uptake rates, and
nutrient balance (Rosegrant and Pingali 1994). In most of the rest of the
developing world there remains substantial scope for increasing crop yields
through increased fertiliser use. In South Asia, for example, fertiliser use is
only about 80 kilograms per hectare; in Latin America, 65 kilograms per
hectare; and in Sub-Saharan Africa, only about 20 kilograms per hectare
(Bumb and Baanante 1996).
8.1 Future growth in fertiliser demand and supply
Bumb and Baanante (1996) estimated e¡ective demand growth for fertiliser,
taking into account foreign exchange availability, exchange rate, crop and
fertiliser prices, the development of irrigation and other infrastructure, and
the impact of policy reforms on fertiliser demand. During the 1990^2020
period, global fertiliser demand is projected to increase 1.2 per cent per year.
In absolute amounts, fertiliser use is projected to increase from about 144
million tons in 1990 to 208 million tons in 2020. Developed countries are
expected to show virtually no growth in fertiliser use, with a slow growth in
North America and a slow recovery in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
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countries is projected to grow at 2.2 per cent per year. While these fertiliser
demand growth rates are relatively low, they are certainly adequate to
support the projected yield growth rates shown above.
Can the production of fertiliser keep up with the projected e¡ective
demand? The projections of supply potential developed by the World Bank/
FAO/UNIDO Industry Fertilizer Working Group (1994) and IFDC (Bumb
1995) suggest that the world will have the capacity to produce between 147
and 163 million tons of fertiliser nutrients in the year 2000. In order to meet
the projected e¡ective demand in 2020, an additional 55 to 71 million tons
of nutrients will have to be produced. Assuming the lower capacity ¢gure for
2000, fertiliser production should be increased at an annual rate of 1.4 per
cent during the 2000^20 period to satisfy the projected e¡ective fertiliser
demand. Given the 5.7 per cent annual growth in fertiliser production during
the 1960^90 period, reaching this required growth should not be di¤cult.
Bumb and Baanante (1996) also show that raw materials are not likely to be
a constraint on meeting future global fertiliser demand.
The one constraint that could slow the expansion of fertiliser capacity is
continued low fertiliser prices. The real price of urea in 1993 was only one-
third of its 1980 price, before beginning to recover, and in 1995 was still only
60 per cent of the 1980 value. The 1995 prices of diammonium phospate,
phosphate rock, potassium chloride, and TSP were also in the range of 50 to
60 per cent of their 1980 values. World Bank (1996b) projections indicate
that fertiliser prices will be stable or slightly lower through 2005. If these
price levels constrain future investment in fertiliser production capacity,
fertiliser prices could increase in later years; this would induce a reduction in
growth in fertiliser use, combined with improved e¤ciency of fertiliser use,
with possibly negative e¡ects on crop yield growth. However, an alternative
simulation with the IMPACT model shows that, even assuming no e¤ciency
gains in fertiliser use, a 50 per cent increase in real fertiliser prices (much
higher than likely increases) would reduce crop yields in 2020 by only about
2 per cent in absolute terms.
8.2 Fertiliser and the environment
Are the projected rates of growth in fertiliser use a threat to the
environment? The two major environmental e¡ects of high levels of fertiliser
use are nitrate leaching or runo¡ and eutrophication. Nitrates can leach from
the soil or run o¡ in drainage water when the supply of nitrogen from
fertiliser and other sources exceeds nitrogen uptake by plants. Eutrophica-
tion occurs when fertiliser is carried by soil erosion and water runo¡ to lakes,
rivers, or other water bodies, potentially causing excess growth of algae,
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concern in Western Europe and parts of North America, and policies are
being put in place to selectively reduce fertiliser use (Leuck et al. 1995).
However, with the possible exception of intensively cultivated areas of East
Asia and pockets of high fertiliser use elsewhere, fertiliser use in developing
countries is so low that nitrate leaching and eutrophication do not pose a
signi¢cant problem. In the intensively fertilised regions, soil fertility
constraints will require improved management and balance of fertiliser
applications.
In many developing regions, and notably in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is not
overuse of fertiliser, but insu¤cient use that causes harm to the environment.
Inadequate replenishment of removed nutrients and organic matter reduce
soil fertility and increase erosion rates. Increased fertiliser use, along with
other complementary measures, can help reverse environmental degradation
by providing much-needed nutrients to the soil, thereby increasing crop
yields and food production. Higher crop yields mean more biomass to be
ploughed back to maintain the supply of organic matter and vegetative
cover, thus enhancing moisture retention, nutrient use e¤ciency and soil
productivity (Bumb and Baanante 1996).
9. Energy and agriculture
Direct (farm machinery, animal and human labour) and indirect
(manufacture of agricultural chemicals, farm machinery and irrigation)
forms of energy have been essential factors in bringing about increases in
agricultural productivity. In the context of the Green Revolution, energy-
intensiveness of agricultural production increased in some cases 100-fold or
more (but from a near-zero base), and plant breeding was aimed at designing
plants that could cope with high levels of fertiliser use (Kendall and Pimentel
1994). In developed countries, manufacture and farm machinery operation
account for the largest but declining share of commercial energy uses in
agricultural production (52 per cent in 1982), followed by chemical fertilisers
with an increasing share (44 per cent in 1982). In developing countries,
however, fertilisers take the ¢rst place with 69 per cent of energy share in
1982 (Bhatia and Malik 1995).
Despite increases in energy intensity in agriculture, agricultural uses of
energy account for only a small fraction of total energy consumption. In
1990, only about 2 per cent of global energy consumption was required to
produce fertiliser, the most energy-intensive agricultural input. By 2020,
energy use in the fertiliser sector is expected to decrease to about 1.6 per cent
of total energy consumption. This is partly due to increasing energy e¤ciency
in fertiliser plants, which has improved considerably after the energy crisis
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as the removal of energy subsidies and ine¤cient organisational structures,
present further possibilities to increase energy e¤ciency (Bumb and Baanante
1996).
Furthermore, overall energy use in agriculture constitutes only a small
part of agricultural production costs. During the last 20 years, direct farm
expenses for fuels, oils, and electricity have varied between 3.5 and 7.4 per
cent of total farm production expenses in the United States. Together with
expenditures for pesticides and fertilisers, the cost share was between 11.2
and 17.2 per cent of total farm production expenses. A study on the e¡ects
of large energy price changes on the agricultural sectors of di¡erent regions
concluded that even very large and sustained increases in energy prices only
lead to small declines in agricultural output and land prices, even in the very
energy-intensive United States (McDonald et al. 1991).
Although overall energy use has been increasing during the last decades,
there is some evidence that energy intensity has been decreasing in developed
countries. Bonny (1993) showed a downward trend of direct energy use in
overall French agriculture since the 1970s, as well as a 30 per cent drop in
direct and indirect energy intensity in the production of one ton of wheat in
a region in France between 1955^60 and 1990. Finally, energy prices are
projected to decrease for the next decades: according to the World Bank
(1996b), crude oil prices are expected to fall from US $51.22 per barrel in
1980 (constant 1990 dollars) to US $13.23 per barrel by 2005.
Energy use has clearly been an essential factor bringing about the Green
Revolution in the 1960s, and will remain essential for achieving food security
in the coming decades. However, with the prospects of increasing energy
e¤ciency, lower energy prices, and in the context of agriculture using only a
small proportion of overall energy, energy availability cannot be considered
a serious resource constraint to long-term agricultural growth.
10. Land degradation
Degradation of agricultural lands is a problem in many parts of the world,
with some areas under severe risk. Kasperson et al. (1996) identify nine
`regions at risk', de¢ned as areas in which human-induced changes threaten
the basic environmental structure and function which, in turn, endanger
human well-being. Scherr and Yadav (1996) point to `hot spots' where land
degradation poses a signi¢cant threat to food security for large numbers of
poor people, to local economic activity, and to important environmental
products and services.
However, while these areas have severe problems that need to be
addressed, these problems are in many cases localised, and will have little
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severity of land degradation on a global basis, and the impact of this
degradation on food production indicate that land degradation at existing
rates is not a serious threat to global food security.
The most comprehensive assessment of global land degradation, Oldeman
et al. (1990), classi¢es the main types of land degradation as soil erosion
from wind and water, chemical degradation (loss of nutrients, soil
salinisation, urban-industrial pollution, and acidi¢cation), and physical
degradation (compaction, waterlogging, and subsidence of organic soils).
Oldeman et al. (1990) mapped a total land base of 13013 million ha, of
which 4048 million ha was forest and woodland, 3212 million ha was
permanent pasture, and 1475 million ha was agricultural land. An estimated
1964 million ha of land within the latter three categories has su¡ered from
some degree of degradation. Water erosion accounts for 56 per cent of land
degradation, wind erosion for 28 per cent, chemical degradation for 12 per
cent and physical degradation for 4 per cent. However, for agricultural land,
chemical degradation is much more important, accounting for 40 per cent
of the estimated 562 million ha of degraded agricultural land (Oldeman et al.
1990). Of the total degraded area, 84 per cent is classi¢ed as having a `light'
or `moderate' degree of degradation, while `strongly' or `extremely' degraded
land accounts for 15 per cent of the degraded area.
10.1 Land degradation and crop productivity
The most important potential agricultural impact of land degradation is
reduction in crop yields. Degradation may also reduce total factor
productivity by requiring the use of higher input levels to maintain yields;
may cause temporary or permanent abandonment of plots; or lead to the
conversion of land to lower-valued uses. As noted above, estimates of the
crop production impacts of land degradation are rare. Comprehensive
country-level studies have only been undertaken for the United States (Alt et
al. 1989; Crosson 1986; Pierce et al. 1984). These studies found very small
long-term yield e¡ects due to soil erosion: if erosion rates continued at the
same rate as in 1982 for 100 years, national average yields would be 3^10 per
cent lower than in the absence of erosion (Crosson and Anderson 1992).
Crop yield losses due to past erosion in Africa were estimated by Lal
(1995), based on existing quantitative data on erosion rates and productivity
relationships. Cumulative crop yield reductions due to past erosion were
estimated to range from 2 per cent to 40 per cent across countries, with a
mean of 8.2 per cent for the continent and 6.2 per cent for Sub-Saharan
Africa (Scherr and Yadav 1996). National estimates of the crop productivity
e¡ects of land degradation are summarised by Scherr and Yadav (1996) for
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comparable data show rates of 0.04 per cent to 11 per cent annual losses in
production. These national level estimates of adverse crop yield impacts of
land degradation con¢rm that degradation can be devastating in some
countries and in fragile environments within sub-regions of countries.
However, degradation rates at the national level do not in general imply a
threat to global food production. Furthermore, even the relatively small
estimated cumulative yield losses may considerably overstate the net impact
of soil erosion. Eroded soil is often not lost to agricultural production, but
rather deposited elsewhere on productive cropland or pasture (Crosson and
Anderson 1992). Thus, in many cases soil erosion is a redistribution of crop
production rather than a production loss.
The only attempt to develop a global estimate of the impact of land
degradation on crop yields was undertaken by Crosson (1995), utilising the
Oldeman et al. (1990) database, as well as a complementary analysis of
dryland degradation by Dregne and Chou (1992). The estimated cumulative
crop productivity loss due to land degradation for the period 1945^90 was
about 5 per cent. This is equivalent to an annual rate of decline of 0.11 per
cent over the period. While this is not an insigni¢cant loss, the impact of
degradation was dwarfed by wheat yield growth of 2.1 per cent per year
during 1967^94.
Land degradation is of overriding importance in some geographic regions,
but unless rates of degradation accelerate dramatically, it is unlikely that
land degradation will be a serious threat to global food supply. Policies to
counteract degradation should be targeted towards high risk zones. In these
zones, signi¢cant public investments in research, technology development,
extension services, and rural infrastructure may be necessary to stabilise or
reverse degradation. More broadly, land degradation can also be mitigated
through policy reforms, such as the establishment of property rights to land,
market and price reforms, and the elimination of subsidies to agricultural
inputs.
11. Irrigation and water resources
The resource base that may pose the most serious threat to future global
food supplies is water. Irrigated area accounts for nearly two-thirds of world
rice and wheat production, so growth in irrigated output per unit of land
and water is essential to feed growing populations. However, development of
irrigation and water supplies is increasingly expensive, limiting the potential
for further expansion of irrigated area and new water supplies. In India and
Indonesia, for example, the real costs of new irrigation have more than
doubled since the late 1960s and early 1970s; in the Philippines, costs have
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Thailand they have increased by 40 per cent (Rosegrant and Svendsen 1993).
The result of these increases in costs (and declining cereal prices) are low
rates of return for new irrigation construction. Reduced rates of return to
new irrigation, coupled with rising environmental concerns, have in turn
greatly slowed the rate of expansion of irrigated areas. Expansion of water
supplies for non-agricultural purposes is also constrained by rising costs. In
many developing countries, new water supplies cost three to four times more
than existing water sources (World Bank 1993).
The high cost of new development puts increased pressure on existing
water sources. In many regions, groundwater is being depleted, as pumping
rates exceed the rate of natural recharge. While mining of both renewable
and non-renewable water resources can be an optimal economic strategy, it
is clear that groundwater overdrafting is excessive in many instances. In the
United States, the equivalent of 4 million ha, one-¢fth of the irrigated area,
is watered by pumping in excess of groundwater recharge (Postel 1993). In
parts of the North China Plain, groundwater levels are falling by as much as
one metre per year, and heavy pumping in portions of the southern Indian
state of Tamil Nadu have been estimated to reduce water levels by as much
as 25^30 metres in a decade.
Non-traditional sources of water are unlikely to be a major component
of new water supplies. Desalination o¡ers an in¢nite supply of freshwater,
but at a high price, and will not be a signi¢cant factor in most regions. The
re-use of wastewater will similarly make an important contribution only in
arid regions such as the Middle East where the cost of new water supplies is
very high. Water harvesting (the capture and diversion of rainfall or
£oodwater to ¢elds to irrigate crops) will be important in some local and
regional ecosytems, but will not have a signi¢cant impact on global food
production and water scarcity (Rosegrant 1995; Rosegrant and Meinzen-
Dick 1996).
Because of the constraints on the development of new water sources, the
rapidly growing household and industrial demand for water will need to be
met increasingly from water savings from irrigated agriculture, which
generally accounts for 80 per cent of water diversions in developing
countries. A particularly di¤cult challenge will be to improve the e¤ciency
of agricultural water use to maintain crop yields and output growth while at
the same time allowing reallocation of water from agriculture to rapidly
growing urban and industrial uses.
To meet this challenge, it is necessary to generate physical savings of water
and economic savings by increasing crop output per unit of evaporative loss
of water; increasing the utilisation of water before it is lost to water sinks;
and by reducing salinisation and other water pollution that diminishes crop
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savings is. Water use e¤ciency in irrigation in much of the developing world
is typically in the range of 25 to 40 per cent, while in urban supply systems,
`unaccounted for water', much of which is direct water losses to the oceans,
is often 50 per cent or more in major metropolitan areas in developing
countries (Rosegrant and Shetty 1994; Rosegrant 1995). These ine¤ciencies
seem to imply the potential for huge savings from existing uses of water.
However, the potential savings of water in many river basins are not as
dramatic, nor as easy to achieve as implied by these e¤ciency ¢gures,
because much of the water `lost' from irrigation systems is re-used elsewhere
(Seckler 1996). In these basins, e¤ciency gains from existing systems may
prove to be limited, because whole-basin water use e¤ciencies are quite high
due to re-use and recycling of drainage water, even though individual water
users are ine¤cient. For example, estimates of overall water use e¤ciencies
for individual irrigation systems in the Nile Basin are as low as 30 per cent,
but the overall e¤ciency for the entire Nile river basin is estimated at 80 per
cent (Keller 1992).
Important research remains to be done on this issue. De¢nitive estimates
of the potential for improving crop yields per unit of water applied, and the
potential for maintaining crop productivity growth while transferring water
out of agriculture requires basin-speci¢c analysis, with aggregation to the
global level to assess the likely e¡ects on food security. Can signi¢cant real
water savings be achieved through improved water management policies?
What would be the impact on food production and food security of transfers
of saved water out of agriculture? Understanding the contributions of water
management, and investment policies to future food security would provide
important guidance to national and international policy-makers, and could
generate large bene¢ts for food producers and consumers in developing
countries.
11.1 Implications for policy and investment
Although important questions must still be answered, a clear place to start
in seeking water savings, improving water use e¤ciency, and boosting crop
output per unit of water is through the reform of existing water policies that
have contributed to the current predicament: both urban and rural water
users are provided with massive subsidies on water use; irrigation water is
essentially unpriced; in urban areas the price of water does not cover the cost
of delivery; and capital investment decisions in all sectors are divorced from
management of the resource.
These water-wasting policies can be attacked through comprehensive
reforms to improve the incentives at each level of the water allocation
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water users to make their own decisions regarding the use of the resource,
while at the same time providing a structure that reveals the real scarcity
value of water. In addition, some of the increasing demand for water must
be met from economically e¤cient development of new water, both through
impoundment of surface water and sustainable exploitation of groundwater
resources, and through expansion in the development of non-traditional
water sources. Future construction of irrigation and water supply projects
will require balanced development approaches acceptable to diverse
constituencies. The full social, economic and environmental costs of
development must be considered, but so must the economic and
environmental costs of failure to develop new water sources. Failure to
address the increasing scarcity of water could signi¢cantly slow the growth
in crop production.
12. Climate change
According to many studies, in the coming decades, global agriculture faces
the prospect of a changing climate, which might adversely a¡ect the goal of
meeting global food needs. The prospective climate change consists of global
warming and associated changes in hydrological regimes and other climatic
variables, such as higher temperatures, shorter growing seasons, changing
moisture regimes and extreme weather patterns, as well as secondary e¡ects
on social and economic systems, induced by increasing concentrations of
greenhouse gases from human activities, especially carbon dioxide (CO2),
which is projected to double by the year 2100 with an expected temperature
rise in the range of 1.5^4.58C (Wolfe 1996; Downing 1993; Kendall and
Pimentel 1994).
Global warming could have both negative and positive impacts on
agriculture. A 18C increase in mean annual temperature may advance the
thermal limits of cereal cropping in the mid-latitude Northern Hemisphere
by 150^200 km (Schimmelpfenning et al. 1996). At higher latitudes, increased
temperatures can lengthen the growing season and ameliorate cold
temperature e¡ects on growth. In warmer mid-latitude environments,
adverse e¡ects of climate change include increased pests and disease on crops
and livestock, soil erosion and deserti¢cation due to more intense rainfall
and prolonged dry periods, as well as reduced water resources for irrigation
(Downing 1993). Despite the many studies on global warming since the
1980s, however, there is no consensus on the impacts of three major variables
on agriculture: the magnitude of regional changes in temperature and
precipitation, the magnitude of the bene¢cial e¡ects of higher CO2 on crop
yields, and the ability of farmers to adapt to climate changes (Wolfe 1996).
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indicated that global warming may have only a small overall impact on
world food production because reduced production and yields in some areas
are o¡set by increases in others. However, tropical regions may su¡er
negative impacts from droughts, due to the nonlinear relationship between
temperature and evapotranspiration, even though climate changes in these
regions are expected to be less; these regions will also face greater di¤culties
in shifting planting dates, as they are limited more by rainfall than
temperature (Reilly 1995). Although results vary by climate change scenario
and by study, regions critically vulnerable in terms of resources to support
their populations and projected decreases in soil water include parts of the
semi-arid tropics and sub-tropics, such as western Arabia, southern Africa,
or eastern Brazil, and some humid tropical and equatorial regions, like
Southeast Asia and Central America (Downing 1993). Most studies also
conclude that changes will bene¢t Japan and China.
Moderate global warming can have positive impacts on crop yields. Most
plants growing in experimental environments with enhanced CO2 levels
exhibit a `CO2 fertilisation' e¡ect that increases crop yields. Under experi-
mental conditions, for rice, wheat, and over 90 per cent of the world's plant
species, the estimated e¡ect from a doubling of CO2 is a 30 per cent yield
increase. For maize, millet, sorghum, and sugar cane, the e¡ect is a much
lower 7 per cent yield increase (Schimmelpfennig et al. 1996). Under ¢eld
conditions, with CO2-stimulated weeds, potential lack of water and other
nutrients, estimated yield increases are estimated to be only one-quarter to
one-third of the e¡ect under experimental conditions (Kendall and Pimentel
1994).
In order to assess the potential impact of climate change on agriculture
and food supply, complex climate, crop growth, and economic-food trade
models have been linked. Between 1989 and 1992, a comprehensive study of
alternative scenarios for the direct e¡ects of greenhouse gas-induced climate
changes on crop yields (wheat, rice, maize and soybean) was conducted at
112 sites in 18 countries with the help of crop growth models. According to
this study, with a continuation of current trends in economic growth rates,
partial trade liberalisation, and medium population growth rates, assuming
modest farm-level adaptations to climate change, and without the CO2
fertilisation e¡ect, the net impact of climate change would be an estimated
reduction in global cereal production of up to 5 per cent by 2060. This global
reduction could be largely overcome by major forms of adaptation such as
installation of irrigation. The climate change would increase the disparities
between developing and developed countries with production in the
developed world possibly bene¢ting from climate change whereas production
in developing nations may decline. Under scenarios that simulate more
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with CO2 fertilisation e¡ect, negative global cereal yield impacts are nearly
eliminated (with estimated yield changes in the range of 1:0 per cent and
ÿ2:5 per cent) and only persist in developing countries (Rosenzweig et al.
1993).
More recent studies conclude that the negative e¡ects of climate change
on agriculture likely have been overestimated by studies that do not take into
account broader economic and environmental implications or account for
economic adjustments. Utilising a modelling approach capturing some of
these adjustment processes, Darwin et al. (1995) conclude that global
changes in temperature and precipitation patterns are not likely to endanger
food production for the world as a whole; that farmer adaptations are the
main mechanisms for keeping up world food production under global
climate change; that costs and bene¢ts of global climate change are not
equally distributed around the world; and that, although water supplies are
likely to increase as a whole under climate change, regional and local water
shortages could occur. The impact on crop yields is generally more positive:
world cereal production increases by between 0:9 and 1.2 per cent, even
without CO2 fertilisation e¡ect (Darwin et al. 1995).
Prospective global temperature increases will occur gradually and not until
far into the next century, and crop yield reductions and economic losses
due to global warming are manageable (and perhaps positive over the next
few decades). Thus, global warming will have little or no impact on global
food production through the year 2020.
13. Conclusions
In this article, projections of future global food supply, based on the
IMPACT model developed by IFPRI, were confronted with possible future
limitations of physical and environmental resources, including plant genetic
resources, fertiliser, land, water, energy, and climate. The broad conclusion
is that environmental and resource constraints are not intrinsically limiting
to the necessary growth in crop production to meet global food demand in
the coming decades.
The case of water shows under what circumstances resources may become
limiting: when agricultural and environmental problems are combined with
bad policy. Of the possible limiting factors discussed here, water scarcity and
pollution may be the most serious threats to the attainment of the necessary
growth in food production. Development of new water sources has become
increasingly expensive and irrigation water will increasingly be diverted to
meet urban and industrial needs. To meet production needs, it will be
necessary to generate both physical savings of water and economic savings
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savings, reforms of existing water policies that have contributed to the
current predicament are crucial. Key elements of these reforms include
establishment of secure water rights to users; decentralisation and
privatisation of water management functions; and utilisation of incentives
for water conservation, including markets in tradable water rights, pricing
reform and reduction in subsidies, and e¥uent or pollution charges.
Generalising from the water context, the set of policies that are necessary
to encourage food production growth while protecting the environment is
quite consistent across the resource issues that were reviewed here. In the
broadest sense, these are policies to improve the £exibility of resource
allocation in agriculture: removal of subsidies and taxes that distort
incentives; establishment of secure property rights; investment in research,
education and training, and public infrastructure; better integration of
international commodity markets; and a greater inclusion of populations in
developing countries into these markets.
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